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Abstract 
This paper presents an approach to providing a rigorous basis for ascertaining 
whether or not a given set of software requirements is internally complete, i.e., closed 
with respect to questions and inferences that can be made on the basis of information 
included in the specification. Emphasis is placed on aspects of software requirements 
specifications that previously have not been adequately handled, including timing 
abstractions, safety, and robustness. 
1 Introduction 
Completeness of requirements specifications is of major significance in modern software 
engineering. Software requirements errors have been found to account for a majority of 
production software failures [BMU75, End 75] and have been implicated in a large number 
of accidents [Lev86]. Many (if not most) of the failures associated with requirements turn 
out to involve incompleteness. 
In defining the nature of the software to be designed and produced, the requirements 
must be sufficient to distinguish the behavior of the desired software from that of any 
other, undesired program that might be designed. If a requirements document contains 
insufficient information to allow designers to distinguish between observably distinct be-
havioral patterns, the requirements document is incomplete. If the differences between two 
*This work has been partially supported by NSF Grant CCR-8718001, NSF VPW Grant RII-8800505, 
NSF CER Grant DCR-8521398, and NASA Grant NAG-1-668. 
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programs that satisfy the same set of requirements are not significant for a given applica-
tion, the incompleteness may not matter, but languages or specification procedures that 
do not permit the expression of subtle distinctions or do not include requirements to cover 
all possible circumstances will be inadequate for some applications. Incompleteness in the 
software requirements specification can have a major impact on testing, formal verification, 
reuse, robustness, and safety of software. 
One application for which completeness is particularly critical is process control, i.e., 
systems that control arbitrarily large or energetic physical phenomena. Such systems are 
usually real-time and often embedded within some larger system such as a ship, aircraft, 
missile, spacecraft, manufacturing or processing plant, or transportation system where 
computers are used to assist in the formulation and implementation of decisions made ei-
ther by the computer and/ or humans for the purpose of controlling the larger system. In 
such process control systems, minor behavioral distinctions often have significant real world 
consequences. The completeness issues discussed in this paper are most relevant for these 
types of systems. Current requirements specification techniques are not sufficiently power-
ful to differentiate among observably distinct behaviors that are potentially important in 
many such process-control systems, nor do they force elucidation of, and specification of 
responses to, "unexpected events." 
Despite its importance, there is no consensus as to precisely what constitutes complete-
ness in requirements specifications nor how to go about achieving it. Many discussions 
essentially assert that "a requirements specification is complete if some relevant aspect has 
not been left out ... "[Rom85]. Ramamoorthy and So [RS78] state that the- most difficult 
part of the requirements statement is the definition of all relevant performance parameters, 
but then they continue to conclude that "there is essentially no notion of completeness as 
far as performance requirements are concerned." Parnas and Clements [PC86] provide 
perhaps the best practical definition of ·completeness to date, but their discussion, focusing 
on the beginning of the requirements engineering cycle and on output characteristics, nec-
essarily omits much of the genuine black-box behavior that is induced by consideration of 
black-box input phenomena. Loading factor, for instance, identified by Ramamoorthy and 
So (op. cit.) as "one of the most important performance requirements," is not discussed. 
More rigorous criteria need to be developed to help ascertain whether or not a given set of 
requirements is, in fact, complete. 
When attempting to define completeness, it is important to distinguish between com-
pleteness and sufficiency. A set of requirements may be sufficient without being complete. 
Absolute completeness in requirements specification may be unnecessary and uneconomi-
cal for some applications. It is necessary, however, to determine the limits of specification 
before deciding what can be left out. As will be seen, a complete specification of a real-time 
system may be quite large and require a great deal of time and effort to produce. For many 
applications, this effort is not justified by the consequences of having some incompleteness 
in the specification. In others, the consequences of any incompleteness may justify the 
2 
extra effort. 
The goal of the work described in this paper is to provide a theoretical foundation for 
the concept of completeness in real-time software requirements specification and to pro-
vide a rigorous basis for ascertaining whether or not a given set of software requirements is 
internally complete, where internally complete is defined as minimally closed with respect 
to a key set of questions and inferences that are based on information already specified. 
Although current real-time requirements specification techniques collectively contain many 
of the features described in this paper, none contain them all and some features are not 
contained in any of them. The goal here is not to propose yet another language for specifica-
tion of requirements, but instead to describe formally what has been scattered throughout 
the literature, to delineate what features real-time specification languages should have, and 
to suggest completeness analysis techniques that are applicable to specifications written in 
such languages. 
2 SCOPE 
There are limits to what currently can be dealt with analytically. For one thing, com-
pleteness is relative to point of view. What is required by one observer may be a matter 
of indifference to another. For example, a development engineering team may want the 
specification to include requirements for instrumentation (such as data recording and check-
pointing). To the engineering team, a specification without such requirements would be 
incomplete, while to the customer or end user, the omission of such requirements is not 
significant and would not necessarily be considered an incompleteness. 
Completeness is also relative to the life cycle phase, even beyond the conventional 
notion of refinement in "level" of detail. For example, a requirements specification must 
often be prepared before a host processor can be selected, and yet after the processor is 
selected, there may be more requirements on the software (such as responses to the full 
set of processor hardware signals observable to the software) induced or derived from the 
characteristics of the selected hardwar.e. If, for example, the chosen processor includes a 
power-out-of-tolerance interrupt that guarantees the existence of at least 30 milliseconds 
further processing time before power ·down, some response to that interrupt should be 
specified. Such a response is still a black-box, behavioral requirement: the trigger, i.e., 
power out of tolerance, and the response are both visible from outside the box. After 
processing hardware characteristics are known, software requirements must be specified for 
the full set of hardware signals observable to- the software. Before a processor is selected, 
however, the lack of such requirements could not be said to constitute an incompleteness 
in the software requirements specification. Thus completeness criteria can be seen to vary 
as a function of the stage of the development cycle. Requirements engineering is a complex 
activity with different stages, different possible paths among those stages, and different 
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completeness criteria needs at each distinct stage. 
With these considerations in mind, this paper considers what might be called "internal" 
completeness. In any application at any given point in time, there is a set of "kernel" 
requirements that derive from the current knowledge of the needs and environment of the 
application itself. They are analytically independent of one another in that the need for 
the existence of any one of them could not be derived from the existence of the others. 
For example, an autopilot program may. or may not control the throttle along with the 
aerodynamic surfaces. Without knowledge of the intent of the application, there can be 
no means of ascertaining whether a particular requirements specification is complete with 
respect to the kernel requirements. This problem of external completeness must be attacked 
from a system engineering viewpoint, e.g., using modeling and analysis of the application 
[LS87, LH83] with respect to various desired properties. This paper deals strictly with 
internal completeness. 
Internal completeness has two aspects. First, there are a great many additional details 
of behavioral description that must be .specified in .addition to an initial or kernel set of 
intended and/ or required functionality. Many of these details cannot be obtained merely 
by the addition of standard "performance" requirements to the kernel functions. Kernel 
requirements are often viewed as being allocated to programs as part of an earlier, systems 
engineering design activity while the remaining information needed to completely charac-
terize the software behavioral description must be :derived from the kernel requirements 
in a later stage of the development cycle. The additional information is still black-box 
behavior; the place to document it is in the requirements document. Note that the re-
quirements specification, then, may itself appear in .different guises in successive stages of 
the development life cycle. 
In addition to derived information, there may also be genuine functionality that has 
been inadvertently omitted and that can be uncovered by rigorous examination and analysis 
of the specified behavior. For example, a specification whose original, principle functional-
ity includes a requirement to generate an alert condition to tell an air traffic controller that 
an aircraft is too low is probably incomplete unless it also includes another requirement 
to inform the controller that an. aircraft previously noted to be too low is now back at 
a safe altitude. Safety and robustness considerations may be exploited to develop such 
application-independent closure criteria. 
A practical complication involves the inclusion: of design information in the require-
ments specification. ·Often requirements and design become intertwined. In order to limit 
the size of the problem, the focus in this paper will be solely on the software behavior, 
i.e., the "what" and not the "how." The product of the requirements phase may be a 
stand-alone document containing only a black-box behavioral description of the software, 
as recommended by Parnas and Clements [PC86],: or it may be a document that inter-
sperses the requirements with design information, as Swartout and Balzer [SB82] assert is 
often unavoidable. However, even a specification that includes design information needs to 
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include a complete set of black-box behavioral requirements as well, and these behavioral 
requirements are the subject of this paper. 
Notational simplicity and sparsity are stressed in this paper: No new notation or mod-
els are introduced: The first-order predicate calculus and a simple state machine model 
are used. These are adequate to express and analyze the types of black box requirements 
needed for real-time software. Note again that the goal is not to provide another language 
for specification of requirements (and certainly the predicate calculus is too awkward to be 
a specification language of choice); the formal notation is for the purpose of providing max-
imum rigor while requiring a small number of primitives in the discussion of completeness 
of requirements in general. The next section introduces the basic notation and definitions. 
3 Definitions and Notation 
A black-box statement of behavior permits statements and observations to be· made only 
in terms of outputs and the externally observable conditions or events that stimulate or 
trigger those outputs. Conceptually, the behavioral requirements may be viewed as a set 
of assertions of the form: trigger # output where the trigger specifies the conditions 
under which an output or set of outputs is to be produced. Note that the implication is 
bi-directional ( # ): Not only must the output exist under certain specified circumstances, 
(i.e., trigger => output), it also must not exist unless it is supposed to (i.e., output => 
trigger). This second direction of the implication has significant impact on the derivation 
of completeness criteria: Because the existence of the output allows the existence of the 
trigger conditions to be inferred, a complete trigger specification must include the full 
set of conditions that may be inferred from the existence of the specified output. Such 
conditions represent assumptions about the environment in which the program or system 
is to execute. 
For black-box requirements, the requirements must involve only observable phenomena 
external to the program whose behavior is being specified. Parnas and Clements [PC86] 
point out the advantages of allowing any external, observable phenomena to be used to 
express trigger conditions, even phenomena not "observable" at the black box boundary 
by the program itself. This is useful in the early life cycle phases, but at some point 
the external observables must get translated into input/output terms: More completeness 
criteria can be applied after this translation. The implication for this paper is that some 
of the requirements completeness criteria presented will be applicable to specifications in 
terms of general observable phenomena, but many will apply only after the specific inputs 
have been determined. 
Completeness requires that both the characteristics of the outputs and the assumptions 
about their triggering events be specified. Formally, requirement assertions are statements 
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of the form 
3Ei, ... ;En 3 PE{::} 3!0 3 Po, 
where PE is a predicate describing the set of stimuli or triggering events Ei for an output 
or set of outputs 0, and Po is a predicate describing the required characteristics of 0. 
Note that the· existential quantification for the output must be unique (3!): In response 
to a single occurrence of the given stimulus or trigger, the program must produce only a 
single output set 0 satisfying the predicate. 
At the black-box boundary, only time and value are observable to the software. There-
fore, the two predicates, PE and Po, must be defined only in terms· of constants and the 
time and value·- t(E) and v(E), respectively - of existentially quantified, observable 
events or conditions. Events are limited to program inputs, prior program outputs, pro-
gram startup (a unique observable event for each execution of a given black-box program), 
and hardware-dependent events: such as power-out-of-tolerance interrupts. In addition, 
conditions may also be expressed in terms of the value of hardware-dependent attributes 
accessible by the software such as time-of-day clocks, sense switches., etc. . 
For reasons to be discussed shortly, every existentially quantified event (other than a 
constant, such as 12::00 noon, for example) must be fully bounded in time- t1 < t(E) <tu 
- except for one: The latest or proximate trigger· Ept is bounded only from below and 
defines a lower bound (not. necessarily the greatest lower bound) for the time of the output 
0. The proximate trigger, then, is the event (including the passage of a specific instant in 
time) that will actually cause the output 0 ·to be produced. 
Other events in the trigger clause represent the necessary state history or conditions 
that must hold upon the observation of Ept for 0 to be required. For example, 
where Su represents program startup,· establishes .11 as the proximate trigger when there 
has been a previous 12 and no intervening / 3 • 
In general, a given output 0 may be triggered by any one of several such trigger clauses; 
thus a trigger may be composed of a disjunction of several trigger clauses. A term or set 
of terms that appears in every disjunctive phrase ·of the trigger clause for a given output 
represents a prerequisite for-the output 0 in the sense that the output cannot be triggered 
(i.e., required) unless the prerequisite conditions are true. 
Using these definitions, section 4 . presents criteria for the complete specification of 
trigger events.: Section 5 discusses the problems involved in completely specifying outputs. 
4 Trigg~r Event Completeness 
Robustness and safety are .intimately connected to completeness in the specification of 
trigger conditions. Trigger conditions specify assumptions about the conditions :jn the en-
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vironment within which the software is to execute. A robust system will detect and respond 
appropriately to violations of these assumptions. Therefore, the robustness of the resulting 
software system depends upon the completeness of the specification of the environmental 
assumptions, i.e., there must be no observable events that leave the program's behavior 
indeterminate. 
Documenting all environmental assumptions and checking them at run-time often seems 
expensive and unnecessary. Many assumptions, for example, are made on the basis of -the 
physical characteristics of input devices and cannot be falsified even under unreasonable 
physical conditions and failures. For example, an input line connected to a 1200 baud 
modem cannot fail in such a fashion as to cause the data rate to exceed 1200 baud. The 
interrupt signal may stick high (i.e., on), but for most modern hardware that will stop data 
transfer, not accelerate it. However, if the environment in which the program executes ever 
changes, the assumption may no longer remain valid; e.g., the 1200 baud modem may be 
upgraded to 9600 baud. Similarly, if the software is ever reused, the environment for the 
new program may differ from that of the earlier one. A striking example of this type of 
problem involved the reuse of air traffic control software in Great Britain that was originally 
written and designed for air traffic control centers in the U.S. It was not discovered until 
after the software was installed that the American designers had not taken zero longitude 
into account which caused the computer to fold its map of Britain in two at the Greenwich 
meridian [Lam88]. 
Besides documentation of assumptions, it may be important for real-time systems to 
check assumptions at run-time when the improper performance of the software may cause 
serious consequences. Examples abound of serious accidents resulting from incomplete 
requirements and non-robust software [Lev86, Neu85]. For example, an accident occurred 
when a mechanical malfunction in a fly-by-wire flight control system set up an accelerated 
environment for which the flight control computer was not programmed; the aircraft went 
out of control and crashed [FM84]. In another incident, an aircraft was damaged when 
the computer raised the landing gear in response to a test pilot's command while -the 
aircraft was standing on the runway [N eu85]. System safety engineers have concluded 
that inadequate requirements specification and design foresight are the greatest cause of 
software safety problems [Lev86]. 
The formal mechanism for ensuring complete specification of assumptions is logical com-
pleteness. The specification of the trigger conditions is logically complete if the logical 'OR' 
of all trigger conditions in the set of requirements is a tautology. For example, if there is a 
requirement on a trigger that the value of an input be greater than 5 (i.e., 31 3 v(l) > 5), 
then a tautologically complete specification would also include a requirement with a trigger 
condition where the input is less than or equal to 5, (i.e., 31 3 v(l) ~ 5). That is, if there 
is a trigger condition for a requirement assertion to handle data within a range, there needs 
to be some other requirement assertion to handle data that is out-of-range. There would 
also need to be a requirement that specified what to do if no input occurred at all. 
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: Formally, if {Ci} is the set of trigger clauses for the specification and Vi Ci = T, the 
specification may be said to be logically complete to the point oCT. If T is a tautology, the 
specification is tautologically complete; in other words, any possible condition expressible 
in terms of the inputs and outputs that appear in the set of trigger conditions {Ci} makes 
at least one of the Ci true and hence there is a requirement to deal with that condition. If 
there is a trigger of the form 3E 3 PE, logical completeness will require dealing with the 
case where -i(3E 3 PE), which is equivalent to •3E V 3E 3 ...,pE. 
Tautological completeness is obviously not in itself enough for a practical requirements 
specification, since a set of as few as two req:uirements could be tautologically complete. 
The degree to which tautological completeness forces the inclusion of additional require-
ments and thus influences completeness and robustness is dependent on the extent of the 
restrictions or assumptions (such as "legal range") specified within the trigger conditions. 
The more information in the trigger conditions (i.e., the more assumptions about the en-
vironment of the software that are specified), the more that tautological completeness will 
ensure that the requirements include res.ponses to the set of "undesired events," i.e., cir-
cumstances where the assumptions are violated. The problem then reduces to determining 
what constitutes a complete specification of assumptions. 
: Many assumptions and conditions are, of course, application-dependent. There are, 
however, some types of assumptions that are essential and should always be specified for 
inputs to safety-critical real-time systems. In the context of real-time systems, the times 
of the inputs and outputs are as important as the values. Therefore, both value and time 
are required in the characterization of the environmental assumptions (triggers) and, as 
will be seen in the next section, the Ot?-tputs. 
· Generally assumptions about value and time can be specified in separable phrases 
although inseparable assumptions are occasionally used. An example of an inseparable 
assumption is a requirement to check the currency of an input containing a time stamp 
placed on it by an external system: v(J) = t(I) ± c. In contrast, a separable, individual 
timing assumption for I would be of the type 
t(Su) < 11 : 59am < t(I) < 12: Olpm, 
if the input were only to be valid if it came at noon. Practical real-time specification 
languages must allow for the general case and permit the specification of assumptions in 
which time, value, and history are inseparable. 
The rest of this section discusses various types of assumptions that should be included 
in trigger event specifications. Some ·of the assumptions relate to what can and should 
be specified for the proximate triggers. There are also criteria relating to the states in 
which an event occurs: The required response to a given event may depend not only on the 
characteristics of the event itself, but on the history of past events and the temporal rela-
tionship between them. The completeness criteria discussed below include essential value 
assumptions, essential timing assumptions, assumptions to deal with "unexpected states" 
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(which are needed for logical completeness), assumptions about startup and shutdown 
states (which are also needed for logical completeness), and responsiveness assumptions. 
Essential Value Assumptions 
The mere existence of an input does not in itself require a value assumption. Consider, for 
example, a hard-wired hardware interrupt that has no value; it may nevertheless trigger an 
output. For. each input l, a value assumption is essential only if v( l) (or some subset of the 
bits of v(l)) is used in defining the value or time of some output 0. If v(l) does not appear 
in any output predicate Po, no assumptions concerning v(l) need to b:e specified. In other 
words, the existence of l helps trigger 0, but v(l) is not referred to further in the definition 
of v(O) or t(O). When v(I) is used in the definition of Po, appropriate assumptions on 
the acceptable characteristics of v(I) must be specified, e.g., range of acceptable values, 
set of acceptable values, parity of acceptable values, etc. 
As noted earlier, even where an assumption is not essential, it should be specified when-
ever possible, i.e., whenever it is known: The receipt of an input with an "unexpected" 
value is a sign that something in the environment is not behaving as the designer antic-
ipated. Checking simple value assumptions on inputs is comparatively inexpensive, and 
since failure of such assumptions is one indication of various, reasonably common hardware 
malfunctions or of misunderstanding about software requirements, it is difficult to envision 
an application where the specification should not require robustness. in this regard, i.e., 
incoming values should have their values checked and there should be a specified response 
in the event of an out-of-range condition. If legal values are specified, tautological com-
pleteness will ensure that specifications contain the necessary information to provide this 
form of robustness. 
Even when real-time response is not required, it is important that violations of as-
sumptions be logged for off-line analysis. A hole in the ozone layer at the South Pole 
was not detected for six years because the depletion of the ozone was so severe that a 
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computer analyzing the data had been suppressing it, having been programmed to assume 
that deviations so extreme must be errors [NYT86]. 
Essential Timing Assumptions 
For trigger conditions, while the specification of the value of an event is usual but optional, 
a timing specification is always required: The mere existence of an observable event (with 
no timing specification) in and of itself cannot be a complete trigger - with the exception 
of program startup. One way to demonstrate this is to examine the formal definition. 
The specification that an output 0 is triggered by the existence of an input l - i.e., 
31 {:} 3!0 - implies that it must also be the case that the non-existence of the output 
implies that the input does not exist - i.e., -dO ==> ·31. However, this is not necessarily 
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true. The simplest example of the implication not being valid is that before the program 
starts running (which is a primitive, observable event), the input I may exist but the 
program will obviously not produce the output 0. This is not an unrealistic case: Serious 
accidents have occurred precisely because designers did not consider the problem of how 
to handle information about the state of the world that arrived while the system was in 
a manual mode and the computer was temporarily off-line. As an example, an accident 
occurred in a batch chemical reactor when a computer was taken off-line to modify the 
software [Kle88]. At the time the computer was shut-down, it was counting the revolutions 
on a metering pump that was feeding the reactor. ·when the computer came back on-line, 
the software continued counting where it had left off with the result that the reactor was 
overcharged. 
As a result, all triggers must include at least one event, i.e., program startup Su, and for 
all events other than startup, at least one timing assumption is essential, i.e., that the event 
occurs after startup. Many other timing assumptions may be essential, including bounds, 
capacity and load, maximum time between events, and graceful degradation, depending on 
the utilization of the event in the specification. Each of these, and the circumstances under 
which they are essential, is discussed below. It is interesting to note that many specification 
languages for embedded systems require the specification of a value condition, while at most 
merely allowing the specification of a timing condition, whereas they should actually do 
the opposite. 
Specifying Bounds on Timing. A valid trigger specification must include either: (1) 
an observable signal (appearing as 3E terms in the notation for triggers); or (2) a spec-
ification involving the non-existence of events, i.e., a duration of time without a specific 
signal. 
To be specified completely, a trigger of the first type must include at least a lower bound 
on time and will, in general, include further timing.constraints. In fact, specifying a trigger 
event whose only lower bound on time is program startup gives rise to the need to specify 
extra requirements, often called capacity or load requirements; these extra requirements 
are discussed below. Table 1 summarizes the various possibilities for timing constraints on 
observable signals. In this table,. x stands for any timing expression. 
Note that even a requirement such as t(J) = 11 : OOam is incomplete. The value of 
t( I) is the value of some reference clock observed ~'simultaneously" with the occurrence 
of I. Conceptually, the clock is a counter that is ·ticking at the rate of one tick per unit 
of temporal precision. There is a problem with this definition of t(I) in that I will not, 
in general, occur simultaneously with a tick In fact, the simultaneity of observed events 
is not physically well-defined. In general, I will occur between two ticks of any clock, no 
matter how frequent t"he ticks. To say that it must ·occur exactly at ll:OOam is meaningless 
unless the specification also specifies what clock is to be used, and, even then, the time 
cannot be known more precisely than the granularity of the clock. Concrete discussion 
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of specific clocks should be avoided in a software requirements specification; all that it 
is really necessary to know is the required precision of the clock. Translating the clock's 
precision into an attribute of the input results in a requirement with bounding inequalities 
rather than an equality, e.g. 10 : 59am < t( I) < 11 : Olam (commonly written as 
t( I) = 11 : 00 am ± lmin) which specifies an accuracy of plus or minus a minute on the 
timing. 
For triggers of the second type, i.e., those that involve the non-existence of an observable 
signal during an interval, both ends of the interval must be either bound by or calculable 
from observable events. Informally, there must be an upper bound on the time the program 
"waits" before producing the output 0. There must also be a specific time to start timing 
the lack of inputs or an infinite number of intervals (and thus outputs) would specified. 
For example, a requirement of the type "if there is no input I for 10 seconds, then produce 
output 0" is not bound at the lower end of the interval and therefore is incomplete. Should 
the non-existence interval start at time t, at t+€, t+2€, etc.? The observable event need not 
occur at either end of the interval, the ends need only be calculable from that event, e.g., 
there is no input for 5 seconds preceding or following event E. An example of a completely 
bounded interval is the requirement that an output 0 be generated if ten seconds elapses 
without the receipt of a specified input message, i.e., 
where t(J1) provides the lower, observable bound of the interval and the duration of 10 
seconds effectively sets the upper bound. The complete rules for timing bounds on non-
existence events are shown in Table 2. Again, in this table x stands for any timing expres-
sion. 
Capacity, Load and Maximum Time Between Events. In an interrupt driven sys-
tem, the count of unmasked input interrupts received over a given period of time partitions 
the system state space into at least two states: normal and overloaded. The required re-
sponse to an input must differ in the two states; there must therefore be separate output 
assertions to deal with them. The term "capacity" seems to be used to refer to the count 
of inputs of a si_ngle type, while load - to be discussed shortly - is the count of a set of 
diverse input events. 
The treatment of capacity depends upon whether interrupts are allowed to be disabled 
or not. Assuming for the moment that interrupts are not locked out on a given port, there 
is always some arrival rate for an interrupt signaling an input that will overload the physical 
machine. Either it will run out of CPU resources as it spends execution cycles responding 
to the interrupt or it will run out of memory as it stores the data for future processing. 
Thus, both the hardware selection and the software design require that an assumption be 
made about the maximum number of inputs N signaled by a given interrupt that must 
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Table 1: Timing Constraints for Observable Trigger Events 
3E 3 t(E) = x 
3E 3 t(E) < x 
3E 3 t(E) > x 
Not by itself a valid trigger except for the event Su. 
Not a valid trigger condition since the simultaneity (equality) of 
two observation times is not physically well-defined. 
The validity of this phrase is dependent on the relationship be-
tween x and t(Su)· 
Ix < t(Su) j Not a valid trigger condition: a program 
cannot differentiate between 3E 3 t(E) < x < t(Su) and 
3E 3 x < t(E) < t(Su)· 
j x = t(Su) j The validity of this phrase depends on the charac-
teristics of the underlying hardware. 
I x > t( Su) I Depending again on the underlying hardware, this 
form might represent a valid trigger condition, but safety con-
siderations dictate careful examination. Even when the hard-
ware supports the necessary observability of an event E prior to 
time t(Su), such a condition should usually lead to two separate 
requirements, 3E 3 t(E) < t(Su) and 3E 3 t(Su) ~ t(E) < x, 
since, in the former case, the time t(E) is not well defined and 
hence could be used either not at all or only with cumbersome 
formalism in the output predicate for the requirement. 
The validity of this phrase is dependent on the relationship be-
tween x and t(Su): 
Ix < t(Su) I Not . a valid trigger condition since the pro-
gram cannot distinguish between 3E 3 t(E) < x < t(Su) and 
3E 3 x < t(E) < ·t(Su)· 
Ix ~ t(Su) I A valid trigger phrase. 
3E 3 x < t( E} < y In general (as per above), this phrase is a legal trigger condition 
iff x ~ t(Su)· 
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Table 2: Timin_g_ Constraints for Simple Non-Existence Event Triggers 
·3E 3 t(E) < x 
Never a. valid trigger condition by itself. 
The validity of this phrase depends on the charac-
teristics of the underlying hardware and the rela-
tionship between x -and t(Su): 
I t (Su) > x I Not a valid trigger phrase, as the pro-
gram cannot differentiate between the case where (·3E 3 t(E) < x] /\ (:iE 3 x < t(E) < t(Su)] 
and the case 3E 3 t(E) < x. 
I t(Su) = x I The validity of this phrase depends on 
the characteristics of the underlying hardware. 
I t(Su) < x I This phrase usually- should be :part of 
a fully :bounded trigger: -,:JE 3 t(Su) < t(E) < x. 
When the requirement is to per.tain to the absence 
of E even prior to program startup, the validity is 
dependent on the characteristics of the underlying 
hardware. 
-dE 3 t(E) > x Never a valid trigger condition. 
·3E 3 t(Su.) < x < t(E) < y The normal trigger condition for "non-event" 
events. Note that y is a lower bound on t( 0) for 
the output 0 triggered by this condition. 
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be accommodated within a duration of time d. This is the requirement called "capacity". 
Multiple capacity assumptions are meaningful, although not necessarily required in any 
given case. For example, the capacities could be 4 per second but not more than 7 in any 
two seconds nor more than 13 in four seconds, etc. One capacity assumption is necessary 
for completeness; multiple assumptions may derive from application-specific considerations. 
There can also be multiple capacities assumed for a given input based on additional data 
characteristics, such as: not more than 4 inputs per second when v(I) > 8 but not more 
than 3 per second when v(I) > 20. Finally, note that a capacity assumption with N = 1 
is the same as an assumption on the minimum time between successive inputs - another 
common "performance constraint." 
Even if a particular statistical distribution of arrivals over time is assumed and specified, 
a capacity limit assumption is still required: Assuming the arrival distribution to be Poisson 
or Erlang does not preclude the possibility, no matter how improbable, of an "overflow" of 
any given capacity. If capacity is exceeded, there must be some specification of the ways 
that the system can acceptably fail soft or fail safe. This is discussed below with respect 
to specifying graceful degradation. 
Where interrupts can be masked or disabled, the situation is more complex. If disabling 
the interrupt could result in a "lost" event (depending on the hardware, the duration of the 
lockout, and the characteristics of the device at the other end of the channel), the need for 
a capacity assumption will then depend on the usage of the input in the specification. An 
input 1 appearing as the only 31 event in a trigger clearly requires a capacity assumption 
since a "lost" I (caused by interrupt lockout) is a violation of the requirement. If 1 is not 
by itself a disjunctive trigger but a conjunctive part of one, its capacity may be dominated 
by some other event. Conjunctive domination of 1 by another event E occurs when, for 
example, a disjunctive trigger clause can be written as: 3! E,I:;, t(E) <t(l) <t(E)+d. In 
this case, an interrupt for 1 could potentially be disabled until the event E is detected, 
then enabled and left enabled until 1 occurs or a period of time d elapses (whichever 
occurs first) and then disabled again. Thus the interrupt could not be overly disruptive 
of the computation, in that it could occur at most once in the specified interval. Note 
that a trigger clause such as 3! 11 , 12 :;, 1t(I1 )-t(12 )1 < d, which appears to contain two 
undominated events, is actually an abbreviation for a trigger of two disjunctive clauses, 
each of which has exactly one undominated event: 
An interrupt-signaled event that is at any time undominated in the requirements specifica-
tion requires a capacity assumption. The capacity of a totally dominated event is inferable 
from its dominators' capacities. 
Formally, capacity is not some separate, special type of requirement (i.e., "perfor-
mance"). Instead it is specifiable as a conjunctive phrase in all disjunctive clauses in the 
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triggers for all outputs that are capacity-dependent: 
where M1( d) is the capacity limit for I during some period of time d. 
Whereas capacity involves a single type of input, load is defined in terms of multiple 
inputs: 
(A) 
where the ki 2:: 1 are weights that allow some inputs to be specified as more "expensive" 
than others and DL( d) is the design load limit for a period of time of duration d. Capac-
ities are assumptions on homogeneous sets of events whereas load is an assumption on a 
heterogeneous set. 
Load is more general than capacity, in that a load condition such as that above will 
suffice to implicitly define ME, ( d), even if no explicit definition is given. In that case, for 
any undefined ME, ( d), the maximum number of Ei possible within a duration of time d will 
be DL(d) (or min{DL,(d)} if there are multiple load assumptions, DLJ, since all the other 
event terms could conceivably be zero unless there are minimum arrival rate assumptions 
mE, ( d) specified as well. If there are minimum arrival rate assumptions specified, the 
maximum capacity for any undefined ME, would be min{DL,J-l:mEj· 
#i 
The smallest period d for which a minimum arrival rate assumption is explicitly assumed 
and specified is the maximum possible time between successive events. If there must be at 
least n events of a given type E within the interval of duration d preceding each event of 
that type - where n/d is the assumed minimum arrival rate - then no more than time 
d can elapse between any two occurrences of events of type E or the minimum arrival rate 
assumption would be false. For embedded systems, robustness dictates the specification of 
a minimum arrival rate assumption for most, if not all, possible inputs: Indefinite, total 
inactivity on the part of any real-world system is unlikely. Robust system design should 
provide a capability for the program to query the environment with regard to inactivity 
over a given communication path. 
In general, inputs to embedded systems should have both minimum and maximum 
capacity assumptions and will often be part of one or more load assumptions as well. A 
bank in Australia reportedly lost a great deal of money by the lack of a requirement to 
deal with "excessive" load [Pur87]. When the central computer was unable to cope with 
the load, the ATMs dispensed funds whether there were funds in the account to cover the 
withdrawal or not. The inability to handle the true load, although irksome, would not by 
itself have caused as much economic damage as that which resulted from the lack of an 
explicit, black-box overload response requirement. 
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Although inputs from human operators or other, slow, external systems may be nor-
mally incapable of overloading a program, various malfunctions could cause excessive, spu-
rious inputs to be generated. Robust system design should consider that case and specify 
a capacity limit for such inputs as a means of detecting possible external malfunctions. 
Note that more complicated expressions than the ones discussed here could be specified 
and still provide the necessary restrictions on .ME, ( d) and mE, ( d) and yet not have names 
as standard "performance" requirements. For example, in the specification of capacity, 
DL( d) (i.e.,"the design load or capacity limit for a period of time of duration d) may not 
be a constant but instead may be equal to some function f(Ei) for some set of Ei. Such 
expressions and others bearing no obvious relationship to standard performance require-
ments may well be valid and required for a given application. Such a possibility is one of 
the reasons that well .defined notions of completeness for· performance requirements have 
proven to be so elusive. The distinction between performance requirements, functional re-
quirements, and other, non-standard but none-the-less black-box behavioral requirements 
is largely a matter of convenience in the interpretation of syntactic forms rather than any 
intrinsic feature or semantic characteristic of the requirements themselves. 
Absorbtivity There may need to be a distinction drawn between input capacity and 
output capacity. If the input environment can generate up to M1( d) inputs of type I during 
a period of duration d, but the output environment can only "absorb" a lower number of 
outputs, the program will need to handle three cases: 
1. The recent input and output rates are both within limits, thus the "normal" response 
can be generated. 
2. The input rate is within limits but the output rate would be exceeded if a normally 
timed output were produced, in which: case some sort of delayed response will be 
required. 
3. The input rate is excessive~ in which case some abnormal response is necessary (see 
below). 
In the case where input and output capacities differ, there must be multiple periods 
for which discrete capacity assumptions are specified. For the largest interval for which 
both input and output capacities are assumed and specified, the absorbtion rate of the out-
put environment must equal or exceed the input arrival rate or the program might never 
catch up; but over shorter durations, the program can buffer or shield the output envi-
ronment from excessive inputs. Input rate assumptions may be determined to be essential 
based solely on specification usage criteria, as discussed earlier; output capacity restric-
tions always stem from application-dependent considerations of the output environment's 
absorbtivity. 
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Graceful Degradation. The requirements needed for logical completeness- to deal 
with overload will generally fall into one of five classes: 
1. Requirements to generate warning messages. 
2. Requirements to generate outputs to reduce the load - i.e .. , messages to external 
systems to "slow down". 
3. Requirements to lock out interrupt signals for the overloaded channels. 
4. Requirements to produce outputs (up to some higher load limit) that have -reduced 
accuracy and/ or response time requirements and/ or some other characteristic that 
will allow the CPU to continue to cope with the higher load. 
5. Requirements to reduce the functionaljty provided by the system (i.e., to cease pro-
viding certain outputs), or, in extreme cases, to shutdown, perhaps only temporarily. 
The first three cases are handled in an obvious way. The fourth case, commonly called 
performance degradation is, as described, somewhat abrupt (i.e., not graceful).. Graceful 
degradation may be specified by including the load in the timing or accuracy fact.ors for the 
output, i.e., if the actual or observed load (during the interval of duration d immediately 
preceding the proximate trigger lpt) is defined as 
AL(d) = Lk;·l{E; I t(lpt)-d < t(E;) < t(lpt)} I' 
i 
then 
31pt • .. · ~ 3!0 • [v(O) = x ±a· AL(d)] 
/\ [ [t(J) + c1 ·AL(d)] < t(O) < [t(J) + c2+ c3·AL(d)Jj 
where 0 < Ci and c3 ~ c1 • Note that c3 must not be zero or the response time is not being 
specified as gracefully degrading: If c1 is equal to zero, the upper limit is increasing, but 
not the lower limit, or delay. Two inputs occurring quite close to one another in time 
could then legally trigger outputs having widely different response times, potentially even 
appearing in inverse order from the order in· which their respective triggers arrived; see 
Figure 1. 
For safety-critical systems, abrupt degradation and/or random (although bounded) 
degradation often needs to be avoided. Certainly for operator feedback, "predictability is 
preferable to variability, at least within limits," even if the cost of the predictability is a 
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Non-graceful Degradation 
Function shedding, the fifth case listed above, is specified by the use of different load 
prerequisites for different outputs - the outputs with the lower load prerequisites being 
"shed" first. When the load is exceeded, then the program changes state, the "normal-
mode-only" outputs cease being required, and possibly new outputs become required such 
as error messages, interface resets, etc. Once a state with a degraded performance has been 
entered, there needs to be a specification of the conditions required to return to a normal 
processing mode. 
Informally, what is needed is a hysteresis delay. After detecting a capacity or load 
violation, the system must not attempt to return to the normal state too quickly or the 
exact same set of circumstances that caused it to leave may still exist. For example, let the 
event that caused the state to change be the receipt of the nth input of 1 within a period 
d, where the capacity is specified as limited to n- l. Then if the system attempts to return 
to normal within a period of x << d, the very next occurrence of an 1 might cause the state 
to change again to the overload state. The system could thus ping-pong back and forth in 
an unacceptable fashion. 
If the trigger for returning to normal is a discrete input event 1 3 Prn, it is straightfor-
ward to expand it to become 
(B) 
where hd is the hysteresis delay and Een is an event that caused the system to exit the 
normal state. In other words, the most recent exit from normal was prior to time hd 
ago. Een should be a trigger in its own right, not just a definition: The system should 
take some observable action upon Een, such as alerting a human operator, disabling or 
requesting resets of busy interfaces, recording critical parameters for subsequent analysis, 
etc. 
Discrete events such as operator actions or reset messages from external (temporarily 
overloaded) interfaces are not the only way a system can return to normal processing. 
It may be desired to attempt to change state purely on the basis of time elapsed since 
last state change. System robustness considerations suggest the specification of a complex 
series of checks on the temporal history of mode exit/ resumption activities to avoid constant 
ping-ponging at a cyclic rate hd. Choice of responses and checking logic is an application-
dependent activity, as is choice of the value hd, but many real-time system requirements 
specifications will be incomplete without inclusion of such behaviors. 
State Completeness Assumptions 
As noted earlier, a trigger of the form 31 3 P1 will, in a logically complete specification, 
require treatment of the case •(31 3 P1), which is logically equivalent to -i31V 31 3 •P1. 
For obvious reasons, the two alternatives generally lead to two very different requirements: 
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the 31 3 •P1 case pertains to unexpected states while the ·31 case has implications for 
startup and shutdown. 
Unexpected States. Informally, when a given state variable is part of an input trigger 
for an input I, a logically complete set of requirements must contain a specified response 
for the receipt of I in conjunction with all possible values for that state variable including, 
where appropriate, the common case of the undefined state. For example, suppose 0 N is 
an abbreviation for the fact that the last input received indicated that an interface device 
was 'on' and OFF indicates that the last input received indicated the device was 'off.' If 
I/\ ON is a trigger for some output, the specification needs to address the case for I/\ OFF 
as well. Furthermore, •ON is not equivalent to OFF, since the "state" of the device may 
be indeterminate if no input has been received. Therefore, there needs to be a requirement 
to deal with the case when •(ON V OFF}. Tautological completeness will ensure that 
such requirements are included. 
Many software problems arise from incomplete specification of state assumptions. For 
example, Melliar-Smith (Neu85] reports a problem :detected during an operational simu-
lation of the shuttle software that occurred when the astronauts attempted to abort the 
mission during a particular orbit, changed their minds and cancelled the abort attempt, 
and then decided to abort the mission after all on the next orbit. The program got into 
an infinite loop which appears to have occurred because the designers of the simulation 
program had not anticipated that anyone would ever want to abort twice on the same 
flight. Another example involves an aircraft weapons management system that attempts 
to keep the load even and the plane flying level by dispersing weapons and empty fuel 
tanks in a balanced fashion (Neu85]. One of the early problems was that even though the 
plane was flipped over, the computer would still drop a bomb or a fuel tank which then 
dented the wing and rolled off. 
In some cases, there really is no requirement to respond to a given input except in a 
subset of the states defined by the state variables to which it is sensitive; but, often, an 
input arriving in an "unexpected" state is a possible indication of a "disconnect" between 
the system and its environment that should not be ignored. For example, a target detection 
report from a radar that has been commanded to the 'off' state is probably an indication 
that either the radar did not shut off or that its detection logic may be malfunctioning. 
If, in fact, the input is of no significance, it is still important, as discussed earlier, for 
documentation and communication purposes that the requirements synthesist explicitly 
record the fact that all the cases have been considered and that the input may truly be 
ignored: An explicit "do nothing" requirement is a practical approach in that case. 
Startup and Shutdown. If there is a requirement 3J ... ¢=> ••• , then the requirement 
-,jJ ... ¢=> ••• is needed for logical completeness. However, this is not an acceptable re-
quirement, for the reasons presented earlier: The trigger condition must state bounds on 
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the interval during which no input l is received. To achieve logical completeness, pro-
gram behavior must be specified for three bounded intervals: the interval prior to program 
startup, the interval of normal program execution, and the interval after program shutdown 
(specified by Sd)· The disjunction of the separate triggers for these bounds: 
·31 3 t(I) < t(Su) 
·31 3 t(Su) < t(I) < t(Sd) 
·31 3 t(I) ~ t( Sd) 
is logically equivalent to the necessary ,3 l case. In addition to considering the absence 
of input in these intervals, there may need to be a specification of responses to input that 
arrives before startup and after shutdown. 
For the first interval, i.e., before the program starts up, completeness considerations 
require assertions with the triggers: 
-dl 3 t(I) ~ t(Su) 
31 3 t(I) ~ t(Su) 
If the hardware cannot retain or indicate the receipt of an input prior to the event Su, the 
program cannot differentiate between the two cases and both conditions should lead to a 
"do-nothing" response. If the (abstract) machine can in fact "observe" the existence of 
an input l prior to the event Su, the program has two startup states with respect to the 
given input (i.e., the input was present or not) and distinct behavior can be required as 
appropriate: 
31 3 t(l) < t(Su) # · · · 
·31 3 t(I) < t(Su) # · · · 
Note that in the case of events occurring before program startup, t(E) is undefined (al-
though bounded from above) and careful consideration must be given to the use of v( E) in 
the requirements, as it is hardware dependent which v(E) is retained in the (unobservable) 
case that there were multiple events E prior to program startup: Some hardware may 
retain the first such event, some the most recent, etc. 
After program startup, there should be some finite bound on the time the program 
waits without receiving a given input before it tries various alternative strategies such as 
alerting an operator or shifting to an open-loop control mechanism that does not utilize 
the absent input. Note that this is very similar to the previously discussed maximum-time-
between events condition but applies to the time after startup in the absence of even the 
first input of a given type. This type of quiescence after startup yields one of the necessary 
·31 intervals noted above, i.e., 
131 3 t(Su) < t(l) < t(Su)+do # 3!0 3 
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There may (and in general, will) be a series of intervals di, d2 , etc. during which the 
program is required to attempt various means of dealing with the lack of input from the 
environment. Eventually, however, there must be some period after· which, in the absence 
of input, the conclusion must be that there is some malfunction and that all future lack of 
that input is of ·no further significance. 
Finally, logic;al completeness requires an assertion that states that after program shut-
down, sd, no outputs are required, i.e., 
and an assertion that considers what to do with inputs that arrive :after shutdown, i.e., 
Responsiveness and· Spontaneity 
Responsiveness deals with the classification of outputs as to their effect on the environment. 
In particular, does a given output 0 cause the environment to change, and, if so, is that 
change detectable at the program's black-box boundary by means of some input I? If the 
environment does not respond to an output withiri some expected period of time, there 
is presumably some abnormality somewhere and the program should be required to act 
accordingly-.perhaps by trying a different output, by alerting a human operator, or, at the 
least,. logging the abnormality for future,. off-line analysis. Bahn [Bah88] reports an accident 
involving a steel plant furnace that was returned to production after being shutdown for 
repairs. A power supply burned out in a digital thermometer during power up so that the 
thermometer continually registered zero degrees. : The controller, knowing it was a cold 
start, ordered 100% power to the gas :tubes. The: furnace should have reached operating 
temperature within one hour, but the computer . failed to detect that the thermometer 
inputs were not increasing as they should have. After four hours, the furnace had burned 
itself out, and major repairs were required. 
Every output 0 to which a detectable response I is expected within a period of time d 
induces at least two requirements: The ·"normal" response requirement, i.e., 
3! 0, I 3 t(0)+8t < t(I) < t(O)+d <=? ... , 
and the requirement (which is needed for logical completeness), to deal with a failure of 
the environment to produce the expected· response. The failure could involve either the 
response having an erroneous or unreasonable value or the expected response might be 
missing entirely, i.e., 
3! 0-;31 3 t(0)+8t < t(I) < t(O)+d ¢> .... 
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where 8t represents a latency period, i.e., the time between the receipt of an input and its 
processing. This is discussed more fully below, but note the need to specify a 8t > 0 here. 
If the environment responds too quickly, one suspects coincidence rather than appropriate 
stimulus-response behavior. A value-based handshake protocol can be used to eliminate 
the need for the 8t factor, i.e., some field of the input I identifies it as uniquely a response 
to some specific output 0. Note that some inputs I are spontaneous, i.e., they may be 
triggered by environmental factors not necessarily caused ·by some prior output 0 .. But an 
input I that is supposed to be non-spontaneous, i.e., one that is only supposed to arrive 
in response to some prior system output, induces yet another requirement to respond to a 
presumably erroneous (i.e., spontaneous) input J: 
3!J-i30 3 t(I)-d < t(O) < t(I) ¢:? •.• 
5 Output Specification Completeness 
The previous section examined completeness with respect to triggers. There are also com-
pleteness criteria that can be applied to the right side of the requirements assertions, i.e., 
the specification of the outputs. Certainly, the criteria for complete specification of out-
puts will differ from those for triggers. In particular, the notion of logical completeness for 
outputs is quite different (and less powerful in its consequences) for ou:tput predicates than 
for triggers. While it is necessary to consider all possible environmental conditions and 
specify responses (or non-responses) to them, it is doubtfol that a software system would 
need to generate all possible types of outputs. Identifying the subset of outputs that is 
required is not a software engineering problem, however; it is a system engineering issue. 
If a particular software behavior is not specified in the system requirements specification, 
it is not reasonable or appropriate to include it in the software requirements specification. 
Therefore, there is no way to guarantee complete detection of missing output requirements 
by looking only at the software requirements specification. 
It is possible, however, to apply logical completeness to that part of the output pred-
icate that deals with the conditional selection of attributes. It is also possible to derive 
application-independent rules and criteria to "close" the output specification with respect 
to various criteria important in the controlled system and thus suggest some outputs that 
may have been inadvertently overlooked that are logically related to the outputs already 
specified. 
Completeness of Output Predicates 
The terms used in the expression of the predicate Po must be one of the following: 
• Constants, 
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• Existentially quantified variables in the triggering events for 0, or 
• Existentially quantified variables in conditional selectors 
The point is that in specifying the characteristics of the output 0, references to the time 
and/or value of other· events E are mathematically undefined unless the other events ac-
tually exist. 
Selector clauses are the. formal representations. of conditional :logic for output value 
definition and· need to be tautologically. complete. In general, if 
v(O) = { : :: ~ 
then AV B must be a tautology .. Similarly, t( 0) can be defined using conditional logic, 
although there :seem to be .few practical cases where it is necessal'.Y· Note the difference 
between triggers and selectors: Triggers determine if an output is to be required at all 
while selectors specify its conting~nt characteristics. 
The complete specification of the behavior of an output 0 requires delineating both 
its time t( 0) and its value v( 0) .. Again note that the time is required. There are three 
possible types· of value specifications: 
1. The requirement for v( 0) involves interpretation of v( 0) as a real number, in which 
case upper and lower bounds are required. 
2. The bit pc;tttern for v( 0) is specified exactly, in which case, equalities such as v( 0) = 
'Enter another file name' are appropriate. 
3. The bit pattern of 0 is no.t a requirement, but some observable attribute of the 
bit pattern (e.g .. , parity) is~ in ·which case the requirement would be specified as 
v(O) E {xi···} .. 
Note that case ( 1), above, interpretation as a real number, can be expressed in terms 
of case (2) for formal simplification:: Using the notation that v/(O) will stand for bit 
positions i through j inclusive, it. is obvious that if l < v( 0) < u, :Ji, j 3 lf = uf and the 
requirement could be expressed as vf ( 0:) . = u{. If case ( 2): is considered specification via a 
fully deterministic bit pattern and case- (3) is: considered specification via non-bit-specific 
attributes, then interpretation as· a real number might be considered a case of partially 
deterministic bit specification (i.e., some bit positions: determined, some not) which is 
reducible to the catenation of a fully deterministic field with a non-bit-specific field. 
Ambiguity of refer.ence in requirements specification is: a common result of incomplete-
ness in selector clauses. As.an example~ consider a requirement to output the sum of the 
last three inputs received: 
v(O) = { ~·v:(Ii) if 3! 11;.12 ,13 3 P1 
-1 otherwise 
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where P1 ::= t(Su) < t(I1) < t(I2) < t(/3) /\ 1 3/4 3 t(/3) < t(I4) /\ V(Ii), with V(Ii) 
including value and range restrictions for the h Without the uniqueness of the existential 
quantification, the term 'I;v(Ii) would not be well defined. Contrast this with a requirement 
where the output is to be zero if there have been at least three inputs received: 
In this case, the unique existential quantification would not be required. 
Timing. There are several special issues with respect to specification of the timing of 
outputs: latency, data age, and the problems involved in specifying complex sets of outputs. 
Note that there is obviously no limit to the complexity of timing specifications for outputs. 
Issues such as minimum and maximum time between outputs are as potentially vital as 
the same concepts pertaining to inputs. The difference is that for inputs, such specification 
is an internal completeness issue; it is possible to determine whether the specification is 
required by looking only at the software requirements. For outputs, a determination of 
whether such a specification is required is dependent upon external completeness issues, 
i.e., particular characteristics of the controlled system. 
Latency. One potential timing incompleteness involves the specification of latency, 
a problem discussed in a slightly different context by Kopetz and Damm[KD87]. Since a 
computer is not arbitrarily fast, there is an interval of time during which the receipt of 
new information cannot change an output 0 even though it arrives prior to the actual 
output of 0. The duration of this interval, called St by Kopetz and Damm[KD87], is a 
factor influenced by both the hardware and the software. An executive or operating system 
that permits interrupts for data arrival may be able to exhibit a shorter St than one that 
polls periodically, but underlying hardware constraints prevent it from being eliminated 
completely. Thus the latency interval can be made quite small, but it can never be reduced 
to zero. The choice of operating system, interrupt logic, scheduling priority and/ or system 
design parameters may be influenced by the value of St. Also, behavioral analysis of the 
requirements (see, e.g., Jahanian and Mok[JM86]) may not be correct unless the value 
of this behavioral parameter is known and specified for a given program. Therefore, the 
requirements must include the allowable St factor in order to be complete. 
As an example, consider an output 0 that is to signal, within a response time rt, the 
fact that no input of type I has been received within the previous period of time of duration 
d. This could be specified as 
3! Su, Ii, 1 312 3 t(Su) < t(I1) < t(I2) < t(I1)+d 
¢:> 3!0 3 t(I1)+d+St < t(O) < t(I1)+d+8t+rt /\ v(O) · · · 
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The use of an interval of time without some event E to trigger an output always requires 
the specification of a ht factor between· the end of the interval and the occurrence of the 
output or the specification is incomplete. Where the upper bound on the interval is a simple 
event, i.e., the proximate trigger is not the non-existence interval but the terminating event 
itself, then latency is not an issue. However, where the intent is to signal the non-existence 
of an input after some other event, then a latency specification is required. This is true for 
both trigger and output predicates. 
In some· cases, the need for latenGy specification- may appear to be application depen-
dent. Consider a trigger of the form: 
If the semantic intent is to be that there is no input 12 prior to the output, the latency 
factor is missing. If the intent is to be that there was an 11 with no 12 within the interval 
around it, the latency factor is unnecessary. Since intent is not analytically tractable, and 
since software may be re-used in environments where the current intentions differ from 
those at the time of the requirements specification, safety considerations dictate that the 
latency factor always be included when the non-existence interval's upper bound is not a 
simple observable event. 
There may need to be additional requii:ement assertions to handle the case where an 
event is observed within the latency period. For example, if an action is taken based on 
the assumption :that some input never arrived and.if it is subsequently discovered that the 
input actually did arrive but too late to affect the output, it may then be necessary to take 
corrective action. 
Data Age. Another important aspect of the specification of timing involves data 
obsolescence. In practical terms, there are few, if any, input values that are valid forever. 
Even if nothing ~lse happens and the entire program is idle, the mere passage of time renders 
much data of dubious validity eventually. Although the program is idle, the real world 
in which the computer is embedded is unlikely to be. Data obsolescence considerations 
require that existential quantification .of input (or output) events in selector clauses must 
be properly bounded in time . 
. . . *? 3!0 • ... J\ v( 0) = { : if 3! 1 3 t{Su) < t(O)-Dv < t(I) < t(O) 
otherwise 
where Dv is the age limit or data validity factor for the input I. Note that t(Su) by itself is 
rarely a proper lower bound. The input is only valid for the output 0 if it occurred within 
the preceding p~riod of time. of duration Dv. As an example of the possible implementation 
implications of such a requirement, MARS [KM85], :a distributed fault tolerant system for 
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real time applications, includes a validity time for every message in the system after which 
the information in the message is discarded. 
Frola and Miller[FM84] report on an accident related to and perhaps caused by lack 
of specification of a data age factor where a computer issued a 'close weapons bay door' 
command on a B-lA aircraft at a time when a mechanical inhibit had been put in place on 
the door. The 'close' command was generated when someone in the cockpit punched the 
'close switch' on the control panel during a test. Several hours later, when the maintenance 
was completed and the inhibit removed, the door unexpectedly closed. The situation had 
never been considered in the requirements definition phase; it was fixed by putting a time 
limit on all commands. 
Specification of Complex Output Sets. Sometimes a given trigger is to require the 
production of multiple outputs, not just a single output. The outputs must have observably 
distinct characteristics in either time or value (or both). There is no limit to the complexity 
of such output set behavior and the details are always application-specific. A particular 
benefit of analyzing complex behavior in terms of the predicate calculus, however, is that 
it highlights the omission of information essential to the discrimination among observably 
distinct behavioral patterns. Such alternatives often have significant safety implications. 
Even so well an understood phenomenon as periodicity, for example, has several pitfalls 
that can be clearly revealed in this fashion. Phase-lock (i.e., the maintenance of a constant 
temporal relationship between two periodic signals), although only one of several potential 
problems that arises in specifying periodics, is perhaps the most obvious example. 
Three free variables are required to be defined for even the simplest periodics: Let 
p = the required periodicity (expressed as a duration of time between successive outputs), 
a = the required timing accuracy, and r0 = a reference time (to denote the start of the 
periodic output). Note that the reference time may be a more complex expression than just 
the time, t( E), of some event. A program that starts a periodic output 10 seconds after 
receipt of some input is exhibiting different behavior than one that commences within 
1 second of the receipt of that input, and this level of detail needs to be included in a 
complete specification. In this case, r0 would need to be replaced by two variables: the 
event E and some initial delayed-response timed. 
There are at least two distinct alternative expressions for periodic behavior. A phase-
locked periodic requires expressing the time of an output as a multiple of the required 
periodic interval after the reference time, r0 : 
Vn ~ 1, :J!On 3 [ro+np-a] <t(On) < [ro+np+a] 
Alternatively, relating the required time for each output to the required interval from the 
preceding output (i.e., defining t( 0 0 ) = r0 ), results in a specification of a free periodic of 
the form: 
Vn ~ 1, :J!On 3 [t(On-i)+p-a] < t(On) < [t(On_i)+p+a] 
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These requirements both capture 'periodic' behavior, but they are quite different: Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the difference. Notice the "drift" of the second specification in comparison 
with the first; the phase-locked periodic in the figure results in 9 outputs in the same inter-
val in which the free periodic (using relative time) has 10 ·outputs. In the first alternative, 
the maximum :time that can elapse between successive outputs of 0 is p + 2a, whereas in 
the second alternative it is only p +a. Even .if the first requirement is rewritten with an 
a' = a/2, which reduces the maximum time between successive outputs of 0 top+ a, the 
same as for· the second alternative, the phase lock difference remains. Let ·Mo ( d) be the 
maximum possible number of occurrences of 0 in a period of time of duration d. For the 
first alternative, jMo(d)-d/pj ~ 1, no matter how large d-gets~ For the second alternative, 
jMo( d)-d/ pj is potentially unbounded: as d .grows arbitrarily large, regardless of the value 
of a. 
As stated in the introduction, the requirements specification document needs to contain 
enough information· to allow designers to distinguish between observably distinct behav-
ioral patterns. Languages or specification procedures that do not permit the expression 
of subtle distinctions will be inadequate for. some applications. None of the existing, ma-
jor requirements languages or techniques has· syntax· for periodics, for example, that can 
discriminate between the two cases described above. The existing abstractions omit -po-
tentially important details. of observable behavior and therefore- are inadequate to express 
completely the requirements for some systems~ In fact, none of these languages include the 
ability to specify all the attributes of value and time described in this paper and considered 
by the authors to be essential. Some of these attributes are not specifiable in any of the 
languages. 
Criteria for Detecting Missing Output Assertions 
As stated earlier, logical completeness is not as powerful a concept when applied to outputs 
as it is for triggers; it is applicable only to that part of the output predicate that deals with 
the conditional selection of attributes. There are, however, some application-independent 
criteria in the form of rules and heuristics using .state· information that can be used to 
evaluate output event specifications and detect some missing types of functionality. Safety 
and robustness.criteria, for example, may be·exploited to: develop these type of application-
independent closure criteria. Several examples of such criteria are described below. There 
are additional useful· criteria that can be developed other than those discussed below, 
but the criteria presented below are important for many real-time applications and are 
illustrative of the types of ·criteria that. can be used. 
Completeness Based on Output Values.· Specification of possible values of outputs 
is important in completeness analysis as it was for triggers·. There is a great likelihood that 
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Figure 2: Earliest possible outputs for the two periodics, one phase-locked, the other not. 
Both have p = 2 and a= 0.2 Note that after time 18, alternative 2 has produced one more 
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a specification is incomplete if there is some legal value for the output that never appears 
on the right side of an equality for v(O). For example, if v(O) E {'on', 'off'} and the 
set of requirements specifies when to .generate v( 0) = 'on' but imposes no requirement 
to generate v( 0) = 'off',. the specification is almost certainly incomplete. Forcing the 
requirements to include explicitly the set of discrete values or range of values possible for 
a given output will highlight such incompleteness. 
Reachability and Recurrent Behavior. A common incompleteness in a specification 
is failure to specify how the system can change states once it has "reached" a given state. 
Suppose, for example, that. there is a state (a history of input and output events) abbrevi-
ated MODEn., and that ·MODEn is a prerequisite to the generation of some output X. 
Let the existence of an output X be abbreviated STAT Ex. In that case, when MOD En 
prevents the generation of the output X, ST AT Ex is not "reachable" from system state 
MODEn: Generally, there are some circumstances where that unreachability is appropri-
ate and correct, but it is often indicative ·of an incompleteness. 
Although STAT Ex may not be reachable from MODEy, it may still be reachable from 
MODEz which is reachable from MOD En. Thus, one can distinguish between direct and 
indirect reachability. The nature of the reachability graph for the states involved in the 
trigger for a given requirement is central to one form of completeness. If every prerequisite 
state for a given output 0 is completely unreachable from every inhibiting state, then that 
output can never occur ag~in if the system once reaches any state where it (the output) 
cannot be produced. Whether or not this is an incompleteness is dependent on the applica-
tion. On the one hand, most embedded systems operate in an environment presumed to be 
cyclic (and hence, not irreversible) in nature; but on the other hand, most systems include 
special shutdown behavior .and some may have other, application-dependent, non-recurring 
patterns as well. Startup and shutdown are two common examples. It is a straightforward 
(although non-trivial) task to determine whether or not a given output is reachable from 
a given state; where it is not, there is a potential incompleteness and the requirements 
synthesist must call into play knowledge from the application domain to resolve the issue. 
Even where a given output's behavior is to be repeatable, there is the question of the 
nature of the prerequisites for repetition. An output to turn a piece of equipment 'on' may 
perhaps be inappropriate unless the last output turned the equipment 'off'. By including 
a check of the last output condition in the prerequisites for the next output condition, 
a specification that is to be logically complete would then be forced to deal both with 
the start-up problem (there has been no prior output) and the possible error condition 
that, for example, something seems to be trying repeatedly to turn a piece of equipment 
'off' even though it is already 'off'. The point here is that repeatable outputs may have 
preconditions on their repetition that should be included in their trigger clauses. 
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Reversibility. The 'on'/'of f' behavior discussed above is significant not only from the 
standpoint of repeatability but also as an example of the interesting output characteristic 
of "reversibility". Outputs should be reviewed and classified as to their reversibility. In 
addition to obvious reversibility, as in the 'on' /'off' case, many outputs are reversible by 
dissimilar outputs. For example, an alert condition to an operator - e .. g., a minimum-
safe-altitude-warning to an air traffic controller - should be reversible when the condition 
is no longer true. But there may need to be several different classes of reversing outputs, 
depending, for example, on whether the controller has acknowledged the receipt of the orig-
inal alert, is in the process of reviewing the alert, or has taken positive action to ameliorate 
the alert condition. The human/machine interface, in particular, is full of complex classes 
of reversible phenomena [Jaf88]. Such "indirectly" reversible outputs require a complex 
set of preconditions, all of which should be specified in order to provide robustness in the 
form of explicit response to the detection of events that would "normally" trigger reversing 
outputs but which occur under "unexpected:" circumstances. 
Path Robustness and Safety. For safety-critical embedded systems, there are addi-
tional concerns. To move from one state to a directly reachable state requires an event; 
to move to an indirectly reachable state requires a series of events. Consider an output 
0 such that v( 0) E {'on', 'off'}. Suppose that there is a state that generates v( 0) ='on' 
but does not generate v(O)='off'. Even if a state that sets v(O)='off' can be reached 
from the state that set v( 0) ='on', there is still the question of the robustness of the be-
havioral path. Suppose that every possible path from a state that sets v( 0) ='on' to any 
state that sets v( 0) ='off' includes the event 31. Then if the system's ability to receive 
l is ever lost, there are circumstances under which it will not be able to set v(O)='of f', 
depending on the state from which the system set .v( 0) ='on'. Thus, the loss of the ability 
to receive l may be said to be a soft failure mode for the event that sets v(O)='of f', 
in that a failure that precludes receipt of l could inhibit setting v(O) ='off'. If there is 
no state from which both v ( 0) = 'off' and v ( 0) ='on' can be generated, and the event 
31 is in every path from a state that. sets v(O)='on' to one that sets v(O)='off', the 
loss of the ability to receive l may be said to be a hard failure mode in that its loss 
will inhibit the event that sets v( 0) ='off'. The more failure modes a set of requirements 
contains, whether soft or hard, the less robust will be the system that is correctly built to 
that specification. 
Note that robustness will not, in general, be the only attribute of the total system 
situation that needs to be considered when specifying the requirements. It may not even 
be desirable at all! Consider the following safety criterion: an unsafe state, i.e., one 
from which an a priori "dangerous" output such .as a command to launch a weapon can 
be produced, should have at least one, and possibly several, hard failure modes for the 
production of the output command: No input received from proper authority, no weapons 
launch! On the other hand, a fail-safe·system should have no soft failure modes, much less 
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hard ones, on paths between dangerous states and safe states. Leveson and Stolzy [LS87] 
describe analysis procedures to provide this type of safety information. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper has described internal completeness criteria for triggers and output :events in 
real-time black-box requirements specification. Emphasis has been placed on aspects of 
software requirements specifications that previously have not been adequately handled, 
including timing abstractions, safety, and robustness. 
There are other types of completeness criteria that can be added to those described here: 
However, the rules included in this paper are certainly minimal. The theoretical foundation 
presented can be used as a basis for deriving and analyzing such extensions. One of the 
obvious omissions from this paper is consideration of the human-machine interface (HMI). 
At the individual requirement level, software requirements for the HMI are no different from 
any other requirements and may be expressed or analyzed via the observable formalism 
developed in this paper. There are additional closure criteria for a set of HMI requirements, 
however, and these are set forth in (Jaf88]. 
One of the conclusions of the work presented in this paper is that a complete require-
ments specification is large, tedious, and unwieldy. Fortunately, it may not be -required. 
For example, it. may be feasible to perform hazard analyses to determine what actions of 
the software are critical[Lev86, LH83, LS87] and to use these analyses to guide and limit 
the requirements specification. For example, outputs that are determined to be hazardous 
with respect to. particular timing issues may require more careful and complete specifica-
tion than those that can be shown to be non-hazardous. We are currently extending the 
analysis techniques to include system requirements and models in order to provide this type 
of information. We are also adding consistency analysis including consistency with safety 
criteria and studying how these completeness and consistency criteria may be applied to 
current formal specification languages. Our long-term goal is to design an environment for 
software requirements specification and analysis in safety-critical, real-time systems that 
includes languages and tools to assist the requirements analyst. 
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